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Employees’ entrepreneurial contributions to firms in Russia, 1995-2004 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines how employee self-reported entrepreneurial contributions evolved in 
firms operating in Russia in the period 1995-2004 and whether changes can be explained by 
Akerlof’s (1982) theory of labour contracts as partial gift exchange. Data from the Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey are used to show that these contributions were indeed 
influenced by wage premia and shifting work norms, declining by about a half during the 
period. There was a particularly marked fall among contributions by manual workers. The 
trend was found among foreign-owned firms as well as private Russian-owned companies. 
The sharp decline in contributions from ‘cadres’ is particularly significant in view of these 
workers’ historic importance in Russian enterprises. Akerlof’s model therefore helps explain 
Russian workers’ changing behaviour.  
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transition 
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Employees’ entrepreneurial contributions to firms in Russia, 1995-2004 
 
1 Introduction 
This article investigates the evolution of entrepreneurial contributions made by employees of 
firms operating in Russia between 1995 and 2004. These contributions may be characterised 
by the phrase ‘going the extra mile’ or, in Whitley’s (1999) conceptualisation, by non-
contractual ‘employee contributions to organisational capacities’; we discuss the 
concept in more detail below. Their incidence appear likely to reflect shifts in how Russian 
employees related to their employment. The subject is significant since it reveals the 
effectiveness or otherwise of approaches to labour management in unlocking employee 
contributions, an explicit aim of HRM. In particular, it allows us to examine how far if at all 
foreign-owned firms have been able to introduce specific labour management practices which 
more effectively unlock these contributions.  
Employee entrepreneurial contributions, it has been argued, are important drivers of 
organisational success and profitability (Thornberry, 2001), strategic renewal (Zahra, 1996), 
and organisational change (Kuratko et al., 2005). They have been at the centre of an 
important trend in HRM, ‘High Performance Works Systems’, which are grounded in the 
argument that previously withheld employee contributions may be unlocked to establish 
competitive advantage (see for example, Appelbaum et al., 2000). Indeed, a central aim of 
HRM has been to seek ‘commitment not compliance’ from workforces, where a key 
component of commitment is a willingness to make higher contributions to organisational 
success (see for example, Walton, 1985; Boxall and Purcell, 2003). Foreign-owned 
companies in Russia are familiar with such ideas, but how far they have been able to put them 
in practice in that national context is unclear (Domsch and Lidokhover, 2007).  
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Researchers have asserted the importance of managers supporting in-enterprise 
entrepreneurship across all hierarchical levels and occupations in order to improve a firm’s 
performance and increase its competitive advantage (Kuratko et al., 2005; Mair, 2005; 
Zampetakis et al., 2009). The few works on corporate entrepreneurship in transition 
economies (for example, Filatotchev et al., 1992; Kaufman et al., 1995; Filatotchev et al., 
1999) focus predominantly on corporate governance issues and the role of managers in 
restructuring former state-owned organisations. Yet Western managers, when compared to 
non-managerial employees, have been shown to respond quite differently to incentives to 
perform in these ways (Kinnie et al., 2005). A handful of studies analyse employee 
entrepreneurship within organisations in market economies (for example, Mair, 2005; Zhao et 
al., 2005; Zampetakis et al., 2009). As far as we have been able to ascertain, no research has 
been published on the wider and significant issue of the entrepreneurial contributions made 
by non-managerial employees in the transition context.  
The article is structured as follows. We first develop an analytical framework 
applicable to the Russian context, deriving two hypotheses. These are tested by using the 
large-scale Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) data in 1995 and ten years later, 
in 2004. Finally, we discuss our econometric results and draw conclusions.   
 
2 Analytical framework 
2.1 Employee entrepreneurial contributions and implicit gift exchange 
We first delineate and describe the forms of contributions under discussion and then 
introduce Akerlof’s (1982) implicit gift exchange model of labour contracts.  
Entrepreneurial activities have been seen by researchers as diffuse and difficult to 
define. As Hornsby et al. (2002) point out there is therefore little agreement regarding the 
specific actions that constitute entrepreneurial behaviour in intra-organisational contexts. At 
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the lowest level, they may include but cannot be defined simply by the extent of working 
time, as would be shown for example by a propensity to work overtime. Not only does 
this fail to capture the full range of discretionary employee contributions, it may in the 
Russian context simply reflect managerial pressure. The various conceptualizations are 
often associated with discrete events such as the creation of new organisations, new entry or 
new product development (for example, Covin and Slevin, 1991; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; 
Endres and Woods, 2006). For employees of Russian organisations, especially those lower 
down organisational hierarchies, the larger scale activities encompassed within these latter 
definitions seem likely to be inappropriate, given the strongly hierarchical nature of these 
companies and the low-trust relations within them. Pearce et al.’s (1997) entrepreneurial 
behaviour model allows both large-scale and more day-to-day possibilities, since it 
encompasses strategic vision, creation of an energetic working environment, change of 
orientation and the ability to ‘cut red tape’. In other international conceptualisations, 
positive employee contributions along these lines include a preparedness to share 
information and knowledge both tacit and explicit, which may in turn generate 
innovation within the organisation (Ekvall, 1996; Gooderham et al., 2010).  
Mair (2005) offers a description that is more likely to characterise what is involved 
when generating a conceptualization of ‘day to day’ entrepreneurship appropriate to Russia. 
Individuals can become entrepreneurial, for instance, in the ways they cooperate with their 
colleagues, in the ways they organize their daily work tasks, or in the ways they meet 
challenges from work organisation, top management or customers (Mair, 2005). Within this 
view, individual entrepreneurial behaviour may therefore be modest in scope and 
encompasses a spectrum of activities ranging from independent/autonomous to 
integrative/cooperative behaviours; the overall aim is to generate new ways of getting things 
done. They may therefore be envisaged as non-strategic activities and practices which 
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nevertheless lead to value creation for the organisation. These are the types of input 
envisaged when the ‘entrepreneurial’ term is used here.  
As we demonstrate below when discussing the current state of labour management, 
the ‘HRM’ paradigm is ill-suited to analysis of the Russian context since strong continuities 
with the Soviet past persist. Therefore, we prefer a more fundamental paradigm focussing 
directly on the employment relationship itself – Akerlof’s (1982) implicit gift exchange 
model of labour contracts. Norms are highly significant within Akerlof’s model, which makes 
it particularly appropriate in the Russian context. In our framework, important factors such as 
changes in ownership and work norms, argued by Soulsby and Clark (2007) to be essential in 
analysing transition contexts, are explicitly incorporated.  
In Akerlof’s theory, the firm’s gift to the worker (in return for the worker’s non-
contractual gifts to the firm) consists in large part of a wage that is fair; the term can be 
equated to the industrial relations term ‘felt fair’, since it is in part normative. Using 
reference-individual-reference-group theory, Akerlof argues that the perceived fairness of 
wages depends on how other individuals in the employee’s reference set are treated.1 The key 
component of the perceived fairness of the wage will be the remuneration received by other 
similar individuals, both employed and unemployed.2 The ‘fair’ wage received by the 
employee depends on perceptions of the entrepreneurship he/she contributes according to and 
in excess of the work rules, the wages of other employees, the work rules themselves and the 
benefits of unemployed individuals. While empirically unemployment at any moment 
encompasses a fairly small fraction of the labour force, flows in and out of unemployment are 
large. In the Russian transition context, the probability that a whole reference set will be free 
of unemployment for a significant period is small; there is a very large ‘grey’ or ‘informal’ 
labour market (Clarke, 2009). In brief, the framework proposes that extra contributions will 
be extracted from employees when a credible implicit gift exchange relationship can be 
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established with them. We therefore hypothesise: employee entrepreneurial activity is 
positively associated with the ‘fair’ wage premium (Hypothesis 1).  
If the hypothesis is upheld, this may mean that foreign-owned companies, which 
frequently attempt to establish competitive advantage in the Russian labour market by paying 
premium wages (Domsch and Lidokhover, 2007), may enjoy higher levels of reported 
entrepreneurial activity than their Russian counterparts. Since they also tend to have equal 
opportunities policies (ibid) we might further expect that these could have a motivational 
effect on female employees, causing them to raise their entrepreneurial contributions.   
 
2.2 The Russian ‘transition’ and the evolution of work norms 
Literature suggests that discretionary employee inputs are most likely to be stimulated 
in corporate environments with high levels of shared decision-taking and trust between 
managers and owners on the one hand and employees and managers on the other, and 
similar levels of worker team participation (for a review see Chang, 2000). A further 
characteristic of this type of corporate environment is that corporate policy emphasises 
intrinsic rather than extrinsic employee rewards (Birkinshaw, 2010). Thirdly, and 
largely as a consequence of the first two characteristics, high levels of ‘social capital’ are 
developed that encourage the development of trust throughout the corporation, building 
knowledge, information sharing and internal innovation (Minbaeva et al., 2003). On the 
other hand, strongly bureaucratic or hierarchical corporate cultures have been shown 
to operate in the opposite direction, stifling discretionary contributions (Gooderham et 
al., 2010). Negative conditions are therefore most likely to be found in Russian 
enterprises that are, or have recently been, state-owned. Private companies, and 
especially foreign-owned MNCs, are more likely to foster more positive climates.  
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It appears unlikely that any of the positive conditions identified above have been 
enhanced in Russia during our period of analysis. First, high levels of distrust, both 
between owners and managers and between managers and employees, have been widely 
emphasised as a problem in Russian firms, in turn hampering the development of 
labour management more broadly throughout the period (Frydman et al., 1996; Blasi et 
al., 1997; Morrison, 2007). Second, Russian managers favour the use of extrinsic 
rewards and in particular payment-by-results systems, continuing late Soviet practice. 
Third, both cause and consequence of the previous point, levels of manager-employee 
trust tends to be low (Domsch and Lidokhover, 2007).  
Thus, Russian political and economic transition is likely to have affected the work 
norms incorporated in Akerlof’s model and both limited and defined the extent of the 
employee-employer ‘gift’ exchange relationship. How this situation developed is therefore an 
important question.   
During the late Soviet era, because of ideological disillusionment, extrinsic rewards 
were perceived as more influential than intrinsic ones in motivating Russian workers (Welsh 
et al., 1993). However, the scope of reward and punishment was generally limited due to the 
worsening economic and political situation (Ivancevich et al., 1992). In the absence of formal 
extrinsic rewards and faced by a joint need to achieve external targets, workers and managers 
engaged in a ‘favour for favour’ exchange process (Hermann, 1994; Shershneva and Feldhoff, 
1998). The strong implicit gift exchange in pre-transition labour relations was combined with 
a distorted price of labour (the ‘fair’ wage) and the policy of full employment. The overall 
result was weakened incentives and norms leading to low employee motivation and low 
levels of employee contributions, as Akerlof’s (1982) model (p. 566, equation 37) predicts 
(see also Kornai, 1992).  
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. Our period of study, the decade beginning in the mid-1990s, certainly saw 
major shifts in  labour market conditions. At the beginning of the period, voucher 
privatisation nominally providing employees with an ownership stake in companies 
(although vouchers moved rapidly out of most employee hands) was in practice 
complete (Morrison, 2007). This may have raised expectations of increased employee 
involvement, improving worker incentives and shifting them towards more uniform 
norms of higher employee effort and entrepreneurship in privatised organisations 
(McCarthy et al., 1993; McCarthy et al., 1997). The second half of the last decade saw a 
change of hands with new private financial-industrial groups taking over much of 
industry. During Putin’s rule the consolidation of ownership in the hands of oligarchs 
through ‘Nomenklatura privatisation’ alienated and disillusioned workers, as many had 
lost their company ownership stake and suffered from wage arrears (Freeland, 2000; 
Sonin, 2003). This was a significant aspect of ‘state-controlled democracy’ as Kuchins 
(2006) described it. By the end of the period, a new Russian Labour Code (coming into 
effect in early 2002) was embedded in practice (Bronstein, 2005). The Code inter alia 
greatly reduced unions’ statutory role in influencing employers’ dismissal decisions 
(Burnham et al., 2004).While the code contained some clauses that were relatively 
protective of workers in international terms, this has to be seen against the background 
of widespread non-observance of all laws and enforcement agencies relating to the 
employment relationship (Ashwin and Clarke, 2003; Royle, 2005). There is also the 
persistence, across our period of analysis and beyond, of wage arrears in both the 
private and public (‘budgetary’ in Russian parlance) sectors despite the fact that they 
represent a fundamental and unlawful breach of the employment relationship. Thus, 
the period appears likely to have been one in which initial hopes of an environment 
more conducive to stimulating discretionary employee inputs may not have been 
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realised in practice (Domsch and Lidokhover, 2007). Relations within organisations 
started to depart from the implicit gift exchange behaviours characteristic of our 
framework (Linz and Semykina, 2008; Rutkowski, 2006).  
A number of in-depth studies document workers’ disillusionment with working life as 
transition proceeded (Siegelbaum, 2004; Morrison, 2007; Clarke, 2009). Workers’ 
increasingly felt that their job security and prospects were worsening (Linz and Semykina, 
2008). Lower level managers themselves became increasingly resistant to owners’ and more 
senior managers’ initiatives (Johnson, 1997). Demoralisation was particularly evident in 
certain strata. Men at the bottom end of the labour market were one such stratum (Ashwin 
and Lytkina, 2004). Banai and Reisel (2007) show that workers in companies with 
concentrated private ownership had often lost their previous jobs in state owned companies 
and, besides experiencing a devastating personal event, also lost many welfare benefits 
traditionally provided by those companies. Consequently, private companies’ workers may 
have been even more alienated than state (or former state) owned companies’ workers.   
Foreign-owned companies (mostly MNCs), which have become increasingly 
important to the Russian economy, might theoretically have been able to resist or overcome 
such effects by their HRM policies and practices. Yet how far they have brought HRM 
approaches with them is unclear since these are only weakly established in Russia even at the 
rhetorical level (Domsch and Lidokhover, 2007). These companies clearly interact with host 
countries’ institutional frameworks to produce ‘hybrid’ sets of practices and to transpose 
Western companies’ management models to ‘transitional’ environments. In transition 
countries these may be viewed both as advanced practices which local managers need to learn 
from and as offering some progress to those adopting them in the foreign-owned companies’ 
internal labour market (Meardi and Toth, 2006). Nevertheless, local environments exercise 
influence over foreign-owned companies’ practices and companies’ portrayal of these as 
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home-country driven cannot be accepted at face value (Doerrenbaecher, 2002). In the Russian 
context, where the balance of power in the employment relationship is strongly weighted 
towards employers, institutions are weak and there are no pressures to ‘Europeanize’ it seems 
likely that senior foreign managements may simply allow labour management to be 
determined by local managers (Croucher and Cotton, 2009). Wider practices beyond 
comparatively high pay may come closely to resemble those of comparable host country 
private (or privatised) companies and ‘demonstration effects’ from foreign owned to 
domestic companies may be very limited.  
Although developments might have brought the Russian labour market closer to the 
neoclassical model where firms never choose to pay more than the market clearing wage, 
Akerlof’s model would still explain the presence of wage premia were implicit gift exchange 
relations in place. Given prevailing work norms, some firms may find it advantageous to pay 
a wage premium because there are some benefits to paying a higher wage. Then the labour 
market would be characterised by heterogeneity through segmentation into primary and 
secondary, and transitory unemployment. Such a framework seems to correspond well to the 
Russian situation.  
In summary, until the mid 1990s when voucher privatisation was widespread the 
incentives for employee entrepreneurship were relatively strong; after 1995, when Prime 
Minister Chubais endorsed the ‘loan for shares’, and especially after 2000, during President 
Putin’s rule, the concentration of private ownership in the oligarchy may have increased 
workers’ sense of alienation and therefore a likely decline in employee entrepreneurship. The 
norms that play such a central role in Akerlof’s model appear likely to have shifted 
considerably away from thrust-based nurturing implicit gift exchange industrial relations. We 
therefore hypothesise: The share of workers in-enterprise entrepreneurial contributions 
declined between 1995 and 2004 (Hypothesis 2). 
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3 Econometric framework and data  
Theoretically, the differential between the market (predicted) wage and the individual (actual) 
‘fair’ wage as defined above will influence employee contributions, and will identify those 
who are likely to work harder and be more entrepreneurial in their jobs.3 We econometrically 
test this theoretical proposition (Hypothesis 1) in two stages. In the first, we estimate the 
‘fair’ wage premia, which are at the core of our analytical framework, and then, in the second 
stage, we estimate the effects of the wage premium and other factors affecting employee 
entrepreneurial behaviour and effort. The dependent variable in the second-stage - 
entrepreneurial contribution - is measured by self-reported involvement in entrepreneurial 
activity as encapsulated in our survey data described below.  
In the first stage, we estimate the difference between the actual (‘fair’) and the 
estimated (market) wage for each individual in our sample by applying a Heckman selection 
model to a Mincerian wage equation (Heckman, 1974). We control for selection into 
employment in this way when estimating the magnitude of the wage rate as a function of 
individual characteristics such as age, education, gender, occupation, and ethnicity (Russians 
vs. non-Russians). Thus, we include in the estimated sample both employed and unemployed 
individuals in the labour force. The approach reflects the assumption that the reference group 
for each individual in the sample comprises all other similar individuals. Implicitly, we also 
assume that individuals have homogenous expectations. To account for regional differences 
we include regional (oblast) dummies in the specification, capturing characteristics such as 
unemployment, prices, and inflation levels; the rate of unemployment benefits is determined 
at national level and is essentially uniform across regions. The predicted wage takes the 
characteristics of all individuals in the reference set and the wages paid to them as well as the 
impact of regional rates of unemployment and, indirectly, the extent of unemployment 
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benefits into account. The main identifying variables in the employment selection equation of 
the Heckman model are, as common in the literature, the level of non-labour income and 
individual and household characteristics such as marital status and numbers of children in the 
household.  
In the second stage of our analysis we focus on employee entrepreneurial 
contributions. The ‘fair’ wage premium constitutes the main explanatory variable, as defined 
in Akerlof (1982; p.561, equation 14). The norms at any given point in time are exogenous to 
the firm and largely depend on the returns to other individuals in the employees’ reference 
sets as well as on institutions. Over time, as we argued above, norms are likely to have 
evolved in Russia. Factors related to the changes in ownership and organisation (for example, 
the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the arrival of MNCs) partially affecting 
employees’ entrepreneurial contributions correspond to what Zampetakis et al. (2009) call 
perceived organisational support (POS). Such factors include the firm’s work rules, the 
average wage paid by the firm and the firm’s incentive system in terms of the different wages 
paid for different levels of output or effort. We use information on wage arrears as a proxy 
for the system of wage (dis)incentives in the firm. We also control for any explicit employee 
firm ownership stake, employee characteristics such as tenure and occupation, firm size, and 
type of firm ownership (state, private and foreign). Most such variables are endogenous to the 
corporate organisation and have been changing over time, thus, affecting norms (Hypothesis 
2). Finally, in the second stage specification we also include regional dummy variables to 
control for geographical variation in institutions and the heterogeneity of the transition 
process.   
For our econometric analysis we employ data from the Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS) spanning the ten-year period between 1995 (round 5) and 2004 
(round 13). The RLMS is a nationally representative survey of individuals and households 
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which samples the population of dwelling units annually.4 The data include a wide range of 
information concerning individual and household characteristics such as demographics, 
education, labour force participation, occupation, time allocation, wages and other incomes. 
Importantly, data on adult individuals also include detailed information about the enterprise 
where each individual is employed and characteristics of employment relations such as 
employees’ role in the enterprise, wage arrears, enterprise ownership, and the number of 
employees in the firm. Our sample consists of all adult individuals of working age - 16 to 65 
years - who were surveyed in the 1994/1995 and 2004 - rounds 5 and 13 respectively - as the 
samples are representative for each period.5 When referring to different categories of 
employees in the data, the terms we use are as follows. The ‘Managers’ category includes 
individuals holding medium or higher level management positions in an enterprise. The 
‘Professionals’ category includes lower level categories such as nurses as well as those, like 
lawyers and teachers, more often associated with the term. The ‘Blue collar’ category covers 
skilled technical and clerical workers and includes many described as ‘cadres’ in Russia. The 
‘Manual workers’ category comprises those employed in semi- and unskilled work.  
The main dependent variable is self-reported involvement in entrepreneurial activity. 
We use a question from the survey in which individuals are simply asked if they feel they are 
performing entrepreneurial activities in their workplace:  
“Как Вы считаете, на этой работе Вы занимаетесь предпринимательской 
деятельностью?” (“Do you feel that you are doing entrepreneurial activities in this 
job?”) 
Clearly, the measure we use is one that reflects respondents’ subjective perceptions, 
allowing them to define for themselves what constitutes entrepreneurial activity. Much 
of this has historically been socially modelled by ‘cadres’ (Arnot, 1988, Morrison, 2007). 
While it is difficult to define the type of activity involved with any great precision, it 
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seems likely to encompass at least some of the activities indicated in our delineation in 
previous sections and to capture at least some elements of their discretionary 
contributions or lack of them.   
 
4 Econometric results 
Table 1 presents definitions and summary statistics for all the regression variables used in our 
econometric analysis by year. Overall, the distributions of the main individual demographic 
characteristics at the two sampling points appear similar and to have remained unchanged 
while the size of the estimated samples increased slightly, from 2,437 to 2,889 observations. 
We find a significant decline in the employee entrepreneurship rate (Entrepreneur) – the 
main dependent variable in our analysis - from 8.1 to 4.7 percent over the ten-year period. 
This is accompanied by a similarly significant decline in the ‘fair’ wage premia (WagePremia) 
and the explicit firm ownership stake held by employees.  
Comparing summary statistics for two groups of explanatory variables over time - 
individual and household characteristics, and determinants of employee entrepreneurial 
contributions - we can see from the individual and household characteristics affecting the 
‘fair’ wage premium, that the proportion of individuals with only primary school education 
has declined by 8 percentage points while the proportion of those with high school education 
has increased by 6 percentage points. The university-educated proportion of the labour force 
has also increased, by 2 percentage points. The proportions of different occupational 
categories have also changed significantly. The proportion of managers has more than 
doubled while the proportion of professionals has slightly decreased. The decline in the 
proportion of manual workers with low skill levels (labourers), over the ten-year period, by 
more than 5 percentage points, is significant, while the proportion of blue collar occupations 
has increased by about the same percentage. There is a relatively significant decrease in non-
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labour income and in the number of adolescent children in households over the ten-year 
period.  
Among the determinants of employee entrepreneurial contributions, besides the 
significant decline in the ‘fair’ wage premia and in the proportion of employees owning an 
explicit firm ownership stake, there are also significant changes in the proportions of firm 
ownership categories. The proportion of state owned firms has declined significantly, by 
almost twenty percentage points, while the proportion of privately owned firms has increased 
by about the same percentage. Foreign-owned firms do not seem to have increased over the 
ten-year period and their proportion has remained almost constant at about 3.4-3.8 percent. In 
our sample, the average firm size has declined, as has the incidence of wage arrears. A 
decline in average job tenure may be taken as evidence of higher labour market turnover – a 
characteristic of an increasingly active labour market. Overall, it is evident that important 
changes in the variables influencing work norms and thus, theoretically, entrepreneurial 
contributions have occurred over the ten-year period.  
The results from estimating the wage equation with the Heckman model are reported 
in table 2. In all regressions the explanatory variables are jointly statistically significant at 1 
percent. In the selection equation, the probability of employment is highest for middle aged, 
university educated men. In 1995, individuals seeking managerial employment are less likely 
to be employed while ten years later professionals and blue collar workers are more likely to 
be employed. Employment opportunities are significantly lower outside the Moscow and St. 
Petersburg metropolitan areas. In the wage equation, the wages of younger to middle aged 
university educated men are highest, with managerial, professional and blue collar 
occupations all commanding higher wages than manual workers. Wages in regions outside 
the Moscow-St. Petersburg metropolitan areas are consistently lower and the gap seems to 
have widened over the ten-year period.  
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In the second stage of our analysis we estimate the total samples in the 1995 and 2004 
survey rounds and subsamples by occupation and gender for each year. In terms of the 
subsamples by occupation, because of the small sample size and their relative similarity, we 
group manual and blue collar occupations in one subsample and professional and managerial 
occupations in another. Table 3 contains tabulations of the rate of entrepreneurship 
(Entrepreneur) by four categories of occupation and two gender categories, by year, and 
reveals significant heterogeneity in the rate of employee entrepreneurship and the changes 
over the ten-year period across occupations and gender. The rate of employee 
entrepreneurship is strikingly low in manual worker occupations and only slightly higher in 
the blue collar occupations. Professional occupations are also characterised by a low rate of 
employee entrepreneurship, while, unsurprisingly, entrepreneurship is significantly higher for 
managerial occupations. The changes over time are remarkable. The drop in employee 
entrepreneurship is highest for manual workers - almost 65 percent -and is similarly high for 
blue collar occupations. For professional and especially for managerial occupations the drop 
is smaller – about 50 and 35 percent, respectively. There is a significant difference in the 
rates of decline in employee entrepreneurship when gender is considered; the decline for 
male employees is almost 55 percent while that for female employees is less than 40 percent.  
Results from estimating the probability of employee entrepreneurship – the focus of 
our analysis - are reported in table 4 and table 5. In all regressions the explanatory variables 
are jointly statistically significant at 1 percent. In table 4, the impact of the ‘fair’ wage premia 
is positive and statistically significant even when we control for an explicit employee 
ownership stake, as this latter effect is also positive and significant in all specifications. It is 
interesting to consider effects in two subsamples. The first comprises managers and 
professionals and the second consists of blue collar and manual workers. The positive effect 
of the ‘fair’ wage premium is stronger in the second subsample in 1995, while in 2004 it 
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becomes more important in the first subsample. Tenure and wage arrears have negative and 
significant impacts on employee entrepreneurship in 1995 but this effect weakens and 
becomes insignificant in 2004. Firm size and state ownership are also negatively associated 
with employee entrepreneurship. Interestingly, the effect of foreign-owned firms on 
employee entrepreneurship does not significantly differ from the effect of private ownership 
by Russian entities. Regional controls suggest that incentives for employee entrepreneurship 
are much weaker in regions outside the Moscow-St. Petersburg metropolitan areas, as this 
negative association weakens over the ten-year period of analysis. In general, the magnitudes 
of the effects are lower in 2004 than in 1995.  
The results from estimating subsamples by gender reported in table 5 are also quite 
interesting in several respects. The magnitudes of estimated effects in the male subsamples 
are, in general, larger than in the female subsamples. For female employees, it seems that 
tenure does not have any statistically significant effect on entrepreneurship, and in 2004 the 
effect of the ‘fair’ wage premia is also insignificant. Furthermore, in 2004, there are no 
statistically significant differences across most of the regions, including the Moscow-St. 
Petersburg metropolitan areas. The most relevant result, however, is that in foreign-owned 
firms women employees seem to be more entrepreneurial than their male counterparts; 
however, the effect weakens over the ten-year period.  
 
5 Conclusion and discussion 
The main contribution of this article has been to examine two hypotheses. The first was that 
entrepreneurial activity could be explained by ‘fair’ wage premia and this was upheld. In our 
framework, when employees accept the employer’s gift as credible and believe that they have 
an implicit stake in the organisation the employee’s entrepreneurial input and increased effort 
become the reciprocal gift to the firm. We found convincing evidence that higher wage 
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premia positively influence entrepreneurial contributions by men and women ordinary 
employees as well as by those in managerial and professional occupations. Entrepreneurial 
incentives remain significantly associated with the ‘fair’ wage premia even when we control 
for an employee explicit ownership stake in the firm. Thus, Akerlof’s model applies to the 
Russian context and not only to the Western environment in which it was originally 
developed.  
The second hypothesis was that the rate of employee entrepreneurial activity declined 
in the ten-year period. This was upheld for the majority of occupations, especially for 
employees in the lowest graded positions and male workers. Indeed, it fell considerably. The 
overall decline in employee entrepreneurship is accompanied by a significant reduction - also 
by about a half - in the ‘fair’ wage premia. In the context of our framework such a decline 
cannot solely be attributed to the increasing efficiency of the Russian labour market. In the 
neoclassical model the firm never chooses to pay above the market-clearing wage because 
there is no advantage in doing so. In Akerlof’s model, however, the interior solution, in 
which the firm finds it advantageous to pay a wage premium, may occur because there are 
some benefits given prevailing norms.  
The results from the analysis of subsamples by occupation and especially gender 
provide evidence for the labour market segmentation and heterogeneity which flows from 
Akerlof’s model. Taken in conjunction with Ashwin and Lytkina’s (2004) findings, this 
suggests a significant gender aspect to workers’ willingness to contribute, since men appear 
more likely than women to have reduced their entrepreneurial activity. It may therefore be 
that foreign companies’ emphasis on equal opportunities and developing positive cultures in 
relation to women may have had some effect, although this appears to have weakened over 
time. There is evidence of a decline in the effect of ‘fair’ wage premia on incentives for 
female workers over the ten-year period. The implicit gift exchange appears to be 
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decreasingly credible for manual and blue collar workers as opposed to managers and 
professionals since the positive effect of the ‘fair’ wage premia on (blue collar and manual) 
entrepreneurship in 2004 weakened compared to that on managers and professionals in 2004. 
Manual and blue collar workers had a high propensity to become unemployed, possibly 
adding to their reluctance to contribute.  
It may have been possible for some Russian firms to create positive gift exchange 
relationships with employees, thereby generating entrepreneurial behaviour by them. But 
overall, such behaviour declined, especially among manual and blue collar workers and male 
workers more generally. This is consistent with other studies from very different schools of 
thought and using quite different methods, notably case studies (for example, Linz, 2003; 
Morrison, 2007; Clarke, 2009). The development is especially significant since these workers 
include ‘cadres’, skilled workers traditionally considered to have a much wider degree of 
initiative than their equivalents in Western Europe (Morrison, 2007). Foreign-owned firms 
showed the same trend as Russian-owned private firms, apparently confirming their 
incapacity to introduce motivational tools that would allow them to insulate themselves from 
the wider context. While in the case of women they were able to mitigate the wider context’s 
impact, this effect weakened over time. These are important underlying realities for the 
practice of HRM in Russia. 
At a theoretical level, our findings demonstrate the fluidity of employee behaviours 
during ‘transition’, suggesting that teleological ‘transition’ and institutionalist ‘path 
dependence’ approaches may obscure important counter-currents. Our analysis suggests that 
the first school’s stress on linear development and the second’s emphasis on institutional 
continuity mask important attitudinal shifts among workers.   
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Endnotes 
1
 In Thompson’s (1991) terms, this is the ‘customary wage’, part of the employees’ ‘moral 
economy’. 
2
 Although individuals do sometimes have reference groups, or reference individuals who are 
dissimilar (Akerlof, 1982), in matters of fairness it appears safe to suppose along with much 
industrial relations literature that most persons compare themselves to persons who are 
similar. 
3
 The argument is formally outlined in Akerlof (1982). If a worker with convex utility and 
positive marginal product for effort has a positive utility for wage income and zero disutility 
for added effort, the firm can increase his compensation and force him to work harder, to the 
advantage of both. If the worker was satisfied with his job before this additional trade, he will 
be even more satisfied afterwards and therefore more willing to remain at his work place to 
make entrepreneurial contributions. 
4
 This is not a true panel survey where sample individuals and households are followed and 
interviewed in each round. However, after 1999 the original design was modified and some 
individuals and households who moved away were surveyed at their new locations. Analyses 
of the RLMS data for attrition, carried out by the Institute for Social Research at the 
University of Michigan, show that the exits can be characterized as random and that the 
sample distributions remain unchanged (Heeringa, 1997). 
5
 Linz and Semykina (2008) use a similar RLMS sample of individuals in the labour force 
and estimate two cross-sections for 1995-1998 and 2000-2004 periods. We also use two 
cross-sections but for one year each - 1995 and 2004 - spanning a period of ten years because 
our goal is to capture and contrast the differences in HRM practices in Russia between early 
and late ‘transition’. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
Variable Definitions 1995 2004 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variables 
Wage Log of hourly wage (real 1995 new Roubles) 2.162 
(0.854)  
2.682 
(0.918) 
Entrepreneur Dummy variable equal to 1 if the employee 
performs entrepreneurial activity and 0 otherwise 
0.081 
(0.272) 
0.047 
(0.212) 
Determinants of ‘fair’ wage 
Age Individual age (year) 39.38 
(10.87) 
38.77 
(11.28) 
PrimSchool Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has 
only completed primary school and 0 otherwise 
0.264 
(0.451) 
0.201 
(0.401) 
HighSchool Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has 
completed high school and 0 otherwise  
0.486 
(0.499) 
0.526 
(0.498) 
University Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has 
completed higher education and 0 otherwise 
0.250 
(0.434) 
0.273 
(0.448) 
Male Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is a 
male and 0 otherwise 
0.452 
(0.498) 
0.427 
(0.495) 
Russian Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is of 
Russian nationality and 0 otherwise 
0.849 
(0.358) 
0.810 
(0.313) 
Manager Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is in a 
managerial occupation and 0 otherwise 
0.017 
(0.127) 
0.047 
(0.212) 
Professional Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is in a 
professional occupation and 0 otherwise 
0.238 
(0.426) 
0.214 
(0.410) 
BlueCollar Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is in a 
blue collar occupation and 0 otherwise 
0.309 
(0.462) 
0.355 
(0.478) 
Labourer Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is in a 
manual work occupation and 0 otherwise 
0.436 
(0.496) 
0.384 
(0.486) 
Married Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is 
married and 0 otherwise 
0.773 
(0.419) 
0.769 
(0.444) 
Children7 Log of number of children in the household age 7 
years or younger 
0.195 
(0.340) 
0.162 
(0.306) 
Children16 Log of number of children in the household age 8 to 
16 years 
0.428 
(0.457) 
0.325 
(0.403) 
HHSize Log of number of adult household members 1.110 
(0.373) 
1.053 
(0.417) 
NLIncome Log of monthly non-labour income per household 
member (real 1995 new Rubbles) 
7.191 
(3.275) 
5.210 
(4.005) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Determinants of employee entrepreneurship 
WagePremia Proportional ‘fair’ wage premium 0.386 
(0.733) 
0.179 
(0.870) 
OwnStake Dummy variable equal to 1 if the employee owns 
up to 50% share in the firm and 0 otherwise 
0.249 
(0.433) 
0.060 
(0.237) 
Tenure Log of number of years working in the same firm 1.994 
(0.888) 
1.604 
(1.084) 
Arrears Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm owes the 
employee wages in arrears and 0 otherwise 
0.299 
(0.458) 
0.112 
(0.316) 
FirmSize Log of total number of employees in the firm 4.784 
(2.050) 
4.504 
 (1.990) 
PrivateRussian Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is owned by 
a private Russian entity and 0 otherwise 
0.244 
(0.429) 
0.415 
(0.493) 
ForeignOwn Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is owned by 
a foreign (private) entity and 0 otherwise 
0.034 
(0.181) 
0.038 
(0.191) 
StateOwn Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is owned by 
the local of central government and 0 otherwise 
0.741 
(0.438) 
0.557 
(0.497) 
Regional fixed effects 
Moscow&SP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual resides 
in Moscow or St. Petersburg region and 0 otherwise 
0.113 
(0.317) 
0.116 
(0.187) 
North&NW Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual resides 
in the North or North-West region and 0 otherwise 
0.079 
(0.270) 
0.076 
(0.248) 
Central Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual resides 
in the Central region and 0 otherwise 
0.191 
(0.393) 
0.191 
(0.393) 
Volga Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual resides 
in the Volga region and 0 otherwise 
0.166 
(0.372) 
0.176 
(0.380) 
NorthCaucasus Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual resides 
in the North Caucasus region and 0 otherwise 
0.128 
(0.334) 
0.123 
(0.317) 
Ural Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual resides 
in the Ural region and 0 otherwise 
0.142 
(0.349) 
0.145 
(0.342) 
WestSiberia Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual resides 
in the West Siberia region and 0 otherwise 
0.093 
(0.290) 
0.086 
(0.255) 
EastSiberia Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual resides 
in the East Siberia region and 0 otherwise 
0.088 
(0.284) 
0.077 
(0.266) 
Total obs.  2437 2889 
Note: The summary statistics reported for each variable are mean and standard deviation (in 
parentheses).  
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Table 2 Wage equation estimated by Heckman two-stage model 
Variable 1995 2004 
Selection Wage Selection Wage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age 0.050 (0.018) 0.015 (0.009) 0.028 (0.015) 0.017 (0.014) 
Age2x10-2 -0.057 (0.023) -0.023 (0.012) -0.036 (0.019) 0.022 (0.018) 
HighSchool 0.002 (0.063) 0.054 (0.038) 0.024 (0.061) 0.046 (0.061) 
University 0.180 (0.099) 0.388 (0.057) 0.172 (0.081) 0.369 (0.078) 
Male 0.192 (.0064) 0.297 (0.036) 0.073 (0.054) 0.253 (0.053) 
Russian 0.043 (0.073) 0.014 (0.044) 0.022 (0.073) 0.088 (0.073) 
Manager -0.325 (0.192) 0.216 (0.125) -0.027 (0.097) 0.352 (0.105) 
Professional 0.086 (0.100) 0.267 (0.056) 0.172 (0.086) 0.308 (0.081) 
BlueCollar 0.075 (0.072) 0.133 (0.042) 0.118 (0.062) 0.167 (0.060) 
Married -0.010 (0.067) - -0.090 (0.058) - 
Children7 -0.125 (0.085) - -0.154 (0.075) - 
Children18 0.102 (0.074) - 0.049 (0.064) - 
HHSize 0.205 (0.087) - 0.129 (0.067) - 
NLIncome -0.272 (0.068) - -0.135 (0.062) - 
North&NW -0.119 (0.128) -0.072 (0.074) -0.397 (0.109) -0.336 (0.109) 
Central -0.293 (0.107) -0.520 (0.057) -0.182 (0.085) -0.584 (0.079) 
Volga -0.426 (0.108) -0.791 (0.059) -0.287 (0.087) -0.821 (0.080) 
NorthCaucasus -0.533 (0.119) -0.738 (0.066) -0.234 (0.096) -0.664 (0.090) 
Ural -0.222 (0.115) -0.373 (0.061) -0.167 (0.089) -0.552 (0.082) 
WestSiberia -0.244 (0.122) -0.210 (0.068) -0.371 (0.107) -0.920 (0.105) 
EastSiberia -0.579 (0.121) -0.166 (0.069) -0.705 (0.091) -0.830 (0.097) 
WaldChi2(16) 673.93 495.73 
Total obs. 4347 4955 
Uncensored obs. 3170 4115 
Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or better and represent 
marginal effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses next to the coefficients. 
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Table 3 Rate of entrepreneurship (Entrepreneur) by occupation and year 
Occupation Manual Blue collar Professional Managers Male Female 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1995 4.97 11.79 7.72 52.38 10.43 6.12 
2004 1.81 4.48 3.70 34.13 4.70 3.88 
Change, % -63.6 -62.0 -52.1 -34.8 -54.9 -36.6 
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Table 4 Probit estimates of determinants of employee entrepreneurship, by occupation 
Variable 1995 2004 
Total Man&Prof Blue&Lab Total Man&Prof Blue&Lab 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
WagePremia 0.014 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.015 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.003) 
0.013 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
OwnStake 0.059 
(0.009) 
0.103 
(0.021) 
0.042 
(0.010) 
0.066 
(0.010) 
0.094 
(0.026) 
0.038 
(0.010) 
Tenure -0.017 
(0.005) 
-0.032 
(0.010) 
-0.011 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Arrears -0.017 
(0.009) 
-0.016 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
FirmSize -0.017 
(0.002) 
-0.015 
(0.005) 
-0.018 
(0.003) 
-0.009 
(0.002) 
-0.009 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.002) 
ForeignOwn -0.003 
(0.019) 
-0.026 
(0.021) 
0.023 
(0.029) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
0.013 
(0.019) 
StateOwn -0.100 
(0.015) 
-0.076 
(0.032) 
-0.101 
(0.017) 
-0.035 
(0.007) 
-0.095 
(0.028) 
-0.025 
(0.007) 
North&NW -0.019 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.032) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.028) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
Central -0.032 
(0.008) 
-0.043 
(0.016) 
-0.024 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.016) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
Volga -0.019 
(0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.021) 
-0.016 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.035 
(0.026) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
NorthCaucasus -0.023 
(0.009) 
-0.028 
(0.017) 
-0.016 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.014 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
Ural -0.028 
(0.009) 
-0.043 
(0.013) 
-0.016 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
WestSiberia -0.030 
(0.009) 
-0.038 
(0.013) 
-0.023 
(0.012) 
-0.012 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.030) 
-0.014 
(0.005) 
EastSiberia -0.022 
(0.010) 
-0.030 
(0.017) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.015 
(0.005) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
-0.016 
(0.006) 
LRChi2(14) 327.46 117.08 230.42 294.15 222.92 200.91 
Total obs. 2437 629 1808 2889 757 2132 
Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or better and represent 
marginal effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. 
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Table 5 Probit estimates of determinants of employee entrepreneurship, by gender 
Variable 1995 2004 
Total Male Female Total Male Female 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
WagePremia 0.014 
(0.004) 
0.017 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.003) 
0.010 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
OwnStake 0.059 
(0.009) 
0.095 
(0.022) 
0.062 
(0.020) 
0.066 
(0.010) 
0.262 
(0.061) 
0.164 
(0.050) 
Tenure -0.017 
(0.005) 
-0.026 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.006 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Arrears -0.017 
(0.009) 
-0.022 
(0.012) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.015 
(0.015) 
FirmSize -0.017 
(0.002) 
-0.021 
(0.004) 
-0.015 
(0.003) 
-0.009 
(0.002) 
-0.008 
(0.002) 
-0.008 
(0.002) 
ForeignOwn -0.003 
(0.019) 
-0.037 
(0.017) 
0.052 
(0.031) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.020 
(0.022) 
0.001 
(0.018) 
StateOwn -0.100 
(0.015) 
-0.110 
(0.022) 
-0.076 
(0.019) 
-0.035 
(0.007) 
-0.038 
(0.010) 
-0.033 
(0.010) 
North&NW -0.019 
(0.011) 
-0.036 
(0.015) 
-0.002 
(0.018) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
Central -0.032 
(0.008) 
-0.051 
(0.014) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
Volga -0.019 
(0.009) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.014 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
NorthCaucasus -0.023 
(0.009) 
-0.044 
(0.013) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
Ural -0.028 
(0.009) 
-0.044 
(0.014) 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
WestSiberia -0.030 
(0.009) 
-0.044 
(0.013) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.005) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
EastSiberia -0.022 
(0.010) 
-0.038 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.005) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.017 
(0.006) 
LRChi2(14) 327.46 200.99 128.95 294.15 187.23 119.69 
Total obs. 2437 1108 1329 2889 1237 1652 
Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or better and represent 
marginal effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. 
 
